The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

Exeutive Summary

Mission Shakti is the Ministry of Women and Child Development’s flagship umbrella scheme for women’s safety, security, and empowerment, structured into two verticals: Sambal for protection and crisis response, and Samarthya for welfare, care, and empowerment programs. While overall resources to women and Mission Shakti have increased in the Union Budget for 2026-27, the internal balance between the two pillars represents key policy concerns.

The majority of Mission Shakti funds are allocated to Samarthya welfare schemes, whereas safety and autonomy-oriented interventions under Sambal receive a fairly smaller share. Feminist critics of the gender budget for 2026-27 claim that, while allocations are significant, funding is targeted toward welfare and basic services rather than structural measures.

This brief suggests that the existing version of Mission Shakti reinforces women’s identity as beneficiaries and caregivers rather than as independent rights-holders and economic agents. It recommends three strategies for reforms: rebalancing allocations towards safety and structural empowerment in Mission Shakti, integrating Sambal and Samarthya interventions

About the Author
Astha Dhal, Bachelor of Arts Mass Communication and Journalism, St. Xavier’s College Mumbai, and Sciences Po Paris

through life-cycle-based program design, and strengthening monitoring systems to track budget increases against safety and autonomy outcomes. These improvements can shift Mission Shakti from a welfare-focused platform to a more progressive mission for women’s rights and freedoms.

• Background and Problem Statement During the 15th Finance Commission, the Indian      government     launched     Mission Shakti as an umbrella programme to provide an  integrated  women’s empowerment framework for safety, security, and empowerment. Under the Ministry of  Women and Child Development (MoWCD), it consolidates several earlier schemes into two verticals: Sambal, which focuses on women’s safety and security through interventions such as One Stop Centres, Women Helpline, Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, and Nari Adalat, and Samarthya,   through    maternity   benefits, care     services, and institutional support such as PMMVY, Shakti Sadan,  Sakhi Niwas, Palna,  and  the  Hub  for Empowerment of Women.

The 2026-27 Union Budget raised Mission Shakti’s allocation, framing it as a key instrument for “women-led development” in a gender budget that now accounts for 9.37% of total Union expenditure.

Despite this quantitative expansion, there is growing concern that the scheme’s architecture still prioritizes welfare and care functions over safety and structural empowerment. This design asymmetry disadvantages women and girls who rely on crisis response infrastructure and demand greater autonomy and economic agency.

2.1 Problem Description

According to available data and secondary assessments, Samarthya receives much more Mission Shakti funds than Sambal. In FY 2025-26, Sambal components (OSCs, helplines, BBBP, and Nari Adalat) accounted for approximately ₹629 crore, while Samarthya components (PMMVY, shelter homes, hostels, crèches, and related projects) received approximately ₹2,521 crore. Mission Shakti is mostly focused on welfare, care, and economic support, with safety, crisis response, and protection and was allocated around one-fifth of the funding.

This imbalance highly limits resource access as insufficient funding for Sambal interventions leads to understaffed OSCs, helplines, and Nari Adalats, impeding the state’s ability to prevent and respond to gender-based violence. In contrast, Samarthya’s emphasis on maternity benefits and basic care, while crucial, primarily presents women as mothers and caregivers in need of aid, rather than individuals entitled to safety, mobility, and economic opportunities. As a result, Mission Shakti’s current design may not adequately address the structural constraints that women experience

• Why Existing Frameworks Fall Short  It can be argued that the existing policy and financial frameworks for Mission Shakti and the gender budget are welfare-focused rather than transformative. The 2026-27 gender  budget  prioritizes nutrition, basic services, and cash transfers over  investments  in  structural empowerment  like land rights, labour protections, and  large-scale care infrastructure. Mission Shakti has consolidated existing  schemes under a unified umbrella, rather than introducing significant new components or institutional reforms to transform power dynamics or broaden women’s choices.

From an intersectional feminist perspective, this means that Mission Shakti, even with enhanced funding, continues to treat women primarily as beneficiaries and dependents. The design does not sufficiently tackle barriers such as unpaid care work, unsafe or informal labor markets, or restrictions on mobility and public       participation.          Moreover, outcome-oriented monitoring for Mission Shakti remains limited: budget documents and public communications emphasize allocations and coverage but provide less clarity on how interventions under Sambal and Samarthya are affecting rates of violence, women’s time use, or their participation in paid work and decision-making. In this sense, the existing framework falls short of the government’s own narrative of “women-led development”.

3. Regulatory and Analytical Framework

Mission Shakti is a centrally sponsored

umbrella scheme under the Ministry of Women and Child Development (MoWCD) that follows Union budget allocations, scheme guidelines, and gender-based budgeting frameworks. It is one of the three core missions that guide MoWCD’s spending on women and children, alongside Mission POSHAN 2.0 and Mission Vatsalya. The Mission Shakti guidelines, which are available on state government websites, specify the objectives, target groups, implementation plans, and funding patterns for the Sambal and Samarthya components. Additionally, the union government’s gender budget statements and think tank analyses give an interpretive framework for determining how Mission Shakti contributes to gender equity and women’s empowerment.

Key Definitions and Classifications  This analysis relies heavily on a few distinct definitions:Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS): A Union government project in which the Centre and states share funding and execution duties, with design guidelines given by the relevant ministry.Budget Estimate (BE): The amount set aside for a scheme at the start of the fiscal year based on predicted needs and policy goals.The Revised Estimate (RE) is an updated estimate of expenditure given later in the financial year, reflecting actual spending trends and revised projections. It corrects the initial BE and sometimes indicates underutilization or re-prioritization of funding for projects like Mission Shakti.Sambal: Mission Shakti’s safety and security vertical, includes interventions such as one-stop centers, women’s helplines, Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, and Nari Adalat, aimed at safeguarding women against violence and providing access to justice.Samarthya: The empowerment and care vertical, includes programs like PMMVY, Shakti Sadan, Sakhi Niwas, Palna, and other institutional support for women’s welfare, childcare, and economic inclusion.

The mission’s classifications distinguish between welfare-oriented and autonomy-enhancing components, allowing for evaluation of whether the existing design promotes transformative empowerment or mainly provides compensatory support.

• Relevant Legislation and Rules Mission Shakti is based on a set of policies         and  institutional    programs rather than a single parent act. The mission’s key milestones include its start during the 15th Finance Commission period, the merging of prior schemes into the Sambal and Samarthya verticals, and succeeding Union Budgets that raised allocations and presented the mission as crucial to women-led development. The Mission’s rules outline the duties of the Union and state governments, funding criteria, and convergence mechanisms that will allow safety, welfare, and empowerment services to function together throughout the life cycle.

Union budget records, particularly the Expenditure Profile and the Gender Budget Statement, serve as the statutory foundation for tracking budget estimates and revised estimates for centrally supported programs such as Mission Shakti.
Infographic 1: Mission Shakti Budget Allocation FY25 – 26

Source: Made by the author using canva

3.   Policy Options Analysis

This section looks at three policy approaches for addressing the design disparity between Sambal and Samarthya. The analysis used four evaluation criteria: legal and institutional consistency with existing Mission Shakti guidelines, simplicity of implementation, equity impact for women with intersecting vulnerabilities, and scalability across states with various capacities.

• Option  1:    Re-balance      Allocations within Mission Shakti

This alternative allocates more Mission Shakti finances to Sambal-type safety and autonomy interventions, such as OSCs, helplines, and Nari Adalats, while maintaining core welfare commitments under Samarthya. Over a medium-term period, intra-scheme reallocation will be guided by risk- and need-based factors, such as gender-based violence prevalence, OSC coverage, and helpline

helplines, and Nari Adalats, while maintaining core welfare commitments under Samarthya. Over a medium-term period, intra-scheme reallocation will be guided by risk- and need-based factors, such as gender-based violence prevalence, OSC coverage, and helpline utilization.

Rationale: Redirecting a small amount of resources to safety and justice can greatly improve the state’s ability to prevent and respond to violence without compromising existing welfare and care programs.

• Option  2:    Integrate     Sambal      and Samarthya through Life-Cycle Design  This alternative will restructure Mission Shakti interventions around a woman’s life cycle, resulting in integrated packages that connect  safety, care, and economic empowerment. For example, survivors who use OSCs might be linked to childcare, skills, and livelihood programs, while PMMVY and childcare recipients could receive information and recommendations to legal and safety services.

Rationale: Treating Sambal and Samarthya as complementary rather than separate silos can enhance both welfare and autonomy outcomes, especially for women facing multiple, overlapping risks.

3.3 Option 3: Strengthen Outcome-Based Monitoring and Gender-Budgeting

This  option  would  layer  a  robust outcome-monitoring and gender-budgeting framework onto Mission Shakti. It would involve defining a small set of core indicators, such as utilisation of OSCs, time to receive support, women’s labour-force participation and time-use changes, and linking them to union and state-level reporting and budget discussions.

Rationale: Clear public data on results is needed to assess the effectiveness of the current Sambal-Samarthya balance in promoting women’s development and justify rebalancing decisions.

4. Recommendations

• Prioritise Safety and Autonomy within Mission Shakti Allocations

The  Ministry  of  Women  and  Child

Development, in collaboration with the

Ministry of Finance and state WCD ministries, should gradually increase the share of Mission Shakti money allotted to Sambal interventions in high-risk districts. Over the next two budget cycles, a proportion of incremental resources should be allocated to strengthen OSCs, helplines, and Nari Adalats, particularly in areas with high rates of gender-based violence and low current coverage.

4.2 Design Integrated Life-Cycle Service Packages

The  MoWCD  and  state  governments should revise implementation instructions so that beneficiaries of Samarthya schemes are routinely linked to Sambal services and vice versa. This could include standardised referral mechanisms between OSCs, Anganwadis, health facilities, and livelihood programs, as well as integrated training for front-line workers to identify and address both safety and care requirements.

4.3 Establish an Outcome-Oriented Monitoring Framework

The Union government should develop a concise dashboard of Mission Shakti outcomes, co-created with states and civil society, and publish it annually alongside gender-budget statements. This framework should track not only financial utilisation under Sambal and Samarthya but also outcome indicators such as time taken to access services, survivor satisfaction, and changes in women’s time use and labour-force participation.

4.4 Embed Intersectional Gender Budgeting in Mission Shakti

MoWCD, in collaboration with the Ministry

of Finance and NITI Aayog, should deepen gender-budgeting practices by explicitly tracking how Mission Shakti resources benefit women facing intersecting vulnerabilities, including caste, class, disability, and rural–urban divides. This would allow budgets to move beyond aggregate allocations and towards more equitable distribution across groups and regions.

5.  Conclusion

Mission Shakti’s two-pillar design acknowledges that women’s lives are influenced by their safety and care needs. The Mission’s ability to produce transformative change is limited by the current balance between Sambal and Samarthya, as well as the welfare-heavy gender budget. With safety and autonomy interventions taking up a small portion of Mission Shakti’s budget, the program risks reinforcing current gender norms rather than expanding women’s choices and freedoms.

Rebalancing allocations towards safety and structural empowerment, integrating services across the life course, and increasing outcome-based monitoring can help Mission Shakti achieve its goal of women-led development. These reforms do not call for the abandonment of welfare or care; rather, they view welfare as a basis for improved safety, justice, and autonomous institutions.

Implementing these measures could transform Mission Shakti from a welfare scheme to a mission that empowers women in households, labour markets, and public life. If they are not, increased budgets and aspirational narratives risk masking an underlying status quo in which women continue to be passive beneficiaries of support rather than active agents of India’s development trajectory.

References:

1. Agarwal, Sonu, and Deepankar Sharma. 2022. “One Stop Crisis Centres for the Redress of Sexual Offenses in India: Addressing Gaps between Policy, Execution, and Implementation.” International Journal of Legal Information 50, no. 3.
2. Agrawal, Mahi. 2026. “An Intersectional Feminist Analysis of the Union Budget 2026–

27.” New Delhi: Feminism in India.

• Botea, Ioana, Wendy Cunningham, and Lindsay Mossman. 2023. Highlights from Africa: Empowering Women and Girls through Social Protection. Washington, DC: World Bank.
• Chakraborty, Lekha. 2023. A Case Study of Gender Responsive Budgeting in India. New Delhi: Feminist Policy in India.
• Chakraborty, Lekha, Marian Ingrams, Yadawendra Singh, and Komal Jain. 2024. “Sector Specific Effectiveness of Gender Budgeting on Gender Equality and Fiscal Spaces.” New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
• Dalal, Koustuv, Masuma Yasmin, Heléne Dahlqvist, and Gunnar O. Klein. 2022. “Do Electronic and Economic Empowerment Protect Women from Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in India?” BMC Women’s Health 22: 510.
• Francis, Anu Maria. 2026. “Union Budget 2026–27: A Review of Gender Budget Allocations.” Kochi: Centre for Public Policy Research.
• Government of India, Ministry of Finance. 2026. Expenditure Profile 2026–27, Statement 13. New Delhi: Government of India.
• India Brand Equity Foundation. 2025. “Mission Shakti Scheme, Objectives and Key Benefits.” New Delhi: India Brand Equity Foundation.
• Khan, Suheba. 2025. Empowering Survivors: An Analysis of India’s One Stop Centre Scheme. Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh: Singh Publication, Aligarh Muslim University.
• Kulkarni, Namratha, and Pavan P. Havaldar. 2024. “Women-Centric Economics: A Closer Look at Gender Budgeting in India.” Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care 13 (9): 3497–3501.
• Ministry of Women and Child Development. 2022. Mission Shakti Guidelines for Implementation During the 15th Finance Commission Period 2021–22 to 2025–26. New Delhi: Government of India.
• Ministry of Women and Child Development. 2024. “Mission Shakti Has Two Verticals ‘Sambal’ and ‘Samarthya’.” Press Information Bureau, March 31, 2024.
• Newiak, Monique, and Ratna Sahay. 2018. Women’s Economic Empowerment and Violence Against Women and Girls. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
• Perera, Camila, Shivit Bakrania, Alessandra Ipince, Zahrah Nesbitt-Ahmed, Oluwaseun Obasola, Dominic Richardson, Jorinde Van de Scheur, and Ruichuan Yu. 2022. “Impact of Social Protection on Gender Equality in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review of Reviews.” Campbell Systematic Reviews 18: e1240.

JINDAL POLICY RESEARCH LAB

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ

The Jindal Policy Research Lab brings together a student research lab and its parent academic school to produce non-partisan, evidence-based work on public policy. Together, they aim to give citizens, policymakers and institutions reliable analysis that can inform public opinion and support sound decision-making, without a predetermined position.

Jindal Policy Research Lab (JPRL)

A student-led research initiative under JSGP that produces non-partisan policy briefs, reports, infographics and commentary on current legislation and public policy, under the mentorship of faculty advisors.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy (JSGP)

The parent school at 91��Ƶ that houses JPRL, offering academic programmes in public policy, governance and electoral studies, and hosting several research centres and initiatives.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ Sonipat Narela Road, Near Jagdishpur Village, Sonipat, Haryana 131001, India Email: info@jgu.edu.in · Instagram: instagram.com/jindalpolicyresearchlab

Website:   jgu.edu.in/jsgp/jindal-policy-research-lab

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

Executive Sumamry

India’s National Food Security Act, 2013, is one of the world’s largest food entitlement programmes, yet more than a decade after its passage, maternal anaemia affects 57% of women aged 15–49 (NFHS-5, 2019–21), and one in three children under five remains stunted. Using data drawn from National Statistical Office Time Use Survey and literature focused on the care economy, it is evident that women bear a disproportionate burden of cooking, caregiving and managing household nutrition intake, performing eight times more \of unpaid care work than men. This brief focuses on the lack in the structural framework of the NFSA and argues that the Act neglects the nuances involved in the process of benefits translating into actual nutritional outcomes.

Background and Problem Statement

Women perform the major part of unpaid domestic work, from feeding children and cooking to managing the entire household’s nutrition intake. The NFSA depends on this labour and thus nutrition outcomes also are a result of this unpaid work. However, there is no compensation or remuneration for this time and care burden.

About the Author
Panna Singhal
Course: B.A. (Hons) Sociology, Miranda House – University of Delhi, 3rd Year Research Interests: Gender, Development, Care Economy, Foreign Policy, Media

Women in households tend to eat last and leftovers, have little to no say in finances and purchasing decisions, and have limited access to mobility. All of these factors determine whether an NFSA entitlement actually reaches the individual woman.

The NFHS-5 (2019–21) records 57% anaemia among women of reproductive age, 32.1% stunting among children under five, and 18.7% wasting, place India as one among the most nutritionally burdened nations.

1.1. Problem Description

The NFSA’s implementation rests on the Public Distribution System (PDS) for subsidised cereals, and the Integrated Child    Development  Services (ICDS)/PMMVY for maternal and child nutrition benefits. These mechanisms depend on accessibility requiring individuals to travel and allocate their time.

India’s first national Time Use Survey (TUS, 2019), covered 2.2 lakh households and found that women aged 15–59 spend 43% (rural) to 47% (urban) of their time on unpaid care work, in comparison to a measly 5% for men. This time poverty is not distributed uniformly. Married women spend 52% of waking hours on unpaid care, against 12% for never-married women; rural women bear a heavier burden than urban counterparts; and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe women also face limited mobility.

1.2. Why Existing Frameworks Fall Short

The NFSA is progressive but largely focuses on food access, instead of food utilisation. It assumes that women will manage cooking, feeding and caring, thus ignoring issues of time poverty and intra-household gender inequality, for instance, the act names the eldest woman of the household as the head for ration cards but this step does not necessarily translate into individual nutritional agency.

Neither PDS nor ICDS adequately target the determinants of undernutrition, which go beyond caloric insufficiency. Under Section 4 of the NFSA, every pregnant and lactating woman is guaranteed free meals for six months and cash benefits of ₹6,000, but PMMVY covers only the first birth, consequently, excluding the majority of women who need it most.

2. Regulatory and Analytical Framework

2.1 Key Definitions and Classifications

2.2. Relevant Legislation and Rules

3. Policy Options Analysis

The policy options may be evaluated on the basis of certain criteria including gender equity, monetary and implementative feasibility, nutrition impact, and scalability.

3.1. Option 1: Amend PMMVY to remove the first-birth restriction and extend cash transfer to all births.

Denying benefits beyond the first birth may violate the rights women should have towards food and nutrition, and may possibly exclude the women who realistically need these benefits the most.

Rationale: Women working in the unorganised sector form over 90% of India’s female workforce yet have no employer-provided maternity benefits. For them, PMMVY is the only mechanism for wage loss during pregnancy. Restricting it only to first births forces them to face a nutritional trade-off for any subsequent pregnancy.

3.2. Option 2: Mandate a Care Infrastructure Component in NFSA State Implementation Plans

Under the NFSA, state governments are required to submit implementation plans and establish State Food Commissions. An amendment to the guidelines could require that these plans also formulate a care infrastructure map which identifies gaps in community childcare centres, elder care facilities, clean cooking fuel access, and water access. Rationale: Time poverty is a significant medium through which care burden suppresses proper nutritional intake. Research consistently shows that women’s

inability to access PDS, Anganwadi, and health services is often constrained by time.

or gender at the grassroot or household level. This would require State Food Commissions to conduct annual

Investment in care infrastructure would reduce this barrier, while also generating employment.

3.3. Option 3: Mandate Gender-Disaggregated Nutrition Audits Using Time Use Survey Data

NFSA’s grievance redressal mechanism (Section 28) and the POSHAN Tracker platform collect nutrition outcome data, but not disaggregated by care-time burden gender-disaggregated nutritional audits and to publish findings as part of their annual reports to state legislatures.

Rationale: The TUS 2024 factsheet reveals that despite five years of the POSHAN Abhiyaan, women’s unpaid care burden has not declined. Without mandating that NFSA implementation machinery track gendered nutritional outcomes, the care economy gap remains invisible to policymakers.

4. Recommendations

The following recommendations are addressed to specific government bodies with the authority to act:

4.1. Ministry of Women & Child Development

Amend PMMVY guidelines to extend the maternity cash transfer of ₹6,000 to all births, not just the first birth. This requires no legislative amendment, only a revision of scheme guidelines under the Ministry’s executive authority, consistent with the language of NFSA Section 4. The ministry should also increase PMMVY’s budgetary allocation, reversing the 50% budget cut of 2020–21, and introduce a monitoring mechanism to track benefit uptake disaggregated by birth order, caste, and state.

4.2. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation

Mandate biennial Time Use Surveys — building on the 2019 and 2024 rounds — as a permanent statistical instrument, with expanded district-level granularity to enable NFSA implementation planning. Require that NFSA state nutrition reports published annually under Section 37 of the Act disaggregate outcomes by gender, care-time burden quartile, and caste, using TUS district estimates as the baseline denominator.

4.3. State Governments through National Food Security Rules

Amend the National Food Security Rules to require State Food Commissions (established under NFSA Section 28) to conduct annual gendered grievance audits. These audits would review patterns in PDS exclusions, PMMVY non-uptake, and Anganwadi absenteeism through a care-time lens. States should cross-reference POSHAN Tracker outcome data with district TUS estimates and publish findings in their annual reports to state legislatures. This creates a mechanism which increases democratic accountability and makes the nutrition gap visible and consequently, actionable upon.

5. Conclusion

The National Food Security Act represents a serious commitment to food and proper nutrition as a right, yet more than a decade of implementation has proved to show inefficiencies. India operates one of the world’s largest food distribution systems while recording among the world’s highest rates of

maternal anaemia and stunted growth in children. This brief has argued that this nutrition gap lies not in the NFSA’s ambition but in its design which is systematically blind to the care economy that determines whether such provisions become nutritional outcomes.

The options and recommendations in this brief include extending PMMVY to all births, integrating care infrastructure into state implementation plans, which operationalises the Act’s life-cycle approach and mandating gendered nutrition audits, which would provide more accountability on part of the system. Combined, they redirect the NFSA towards becoming a more genuinely nutritional act.

The cost of inaction is intergenerational. Undernourished           women           become undernourished mothers and will bear low-birthweight children with increased susceptibility to disease, cognitive impairment, disorders, and lifelong economic disadvantages. Addressing gender disparities in unpaid work could, by one estimate, boost India’s GDP by 27%. The legal authority and provisions to carry out such improvements exist and are feasible, if an efficient trajectory is mapped out. What is required is acting on this issue from a genuinely concerned and intentional place.

References:

1. International Labour Organization. “Care Economy.”
2. UN Women. “FAQs: What Is Unpaid Care Work and How Does It Power the Economy?” care-work-and-how-does-it-power-the-economy
3. Food and Agriculture Organization. “Food Security.”
4. Government of India. 2013. ‘The National Food Security Act, 2013.’ Gazette of India Extraordinary. September 10, 2013.
5. Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 2021. National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019-21. Mumbai: IIPS.
6. ILO (International Labour Organization). 2018. Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work. Geneva: ILO.
7. ILO India. 2021. ‘Expanding Decent Employment Opportunities in the Care Economy in India.’ Project documentation. New Delhi: ILO. employment-opportunities-care-economy-india
8. Coffey, Diane, Angus Deaton, Jean Dreze, Dean Spears, and Alessandro Tarozzi. 2016. ‘Enhancing Nutrition Security via India’s National Food Security Act: Using an Axe instead of a Scalpel?’ Economic & Political Weekly. PMC4811376.
9. Harris-Fry, Helen, Kenda Cunningham, Nadia Mubarak, Mahbubur Rahman, Kishwar Azad, Edward Fottrell, and Alan Osrin. 2021. ‘Maternal Diets in India: Gaps, Barriers, and Opportunities.’

JINDAL POLICY RESEARCH LAB

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ

The Jindal Policy Research Lab brings together a student research lab and its parent academic school to produce non-partisan, evidence-based work on public policy. Together, they aim to give citizens, policymakers and institutions reliable analysis that can inform public opinion and support sound decision-making, without a predetermined position.

Jindal Policy Research Lab (JPRL(

A student-led research initiative under JSGP that produces non-partisan policy briefs, reports, infographics and commentary on current legislation and public policy, under the mentorship of faculty advisors.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy (JSGP(

The parent school at 91��Ƶ that houses JPRL, offering academic programmes in public policy, governance and electoral studies, and hosting several research centres and initiatives.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ Sonipat Narela Road, Near Jagdishpur Village, Sonipat, Haryana 131001, India Email: info@jgu.edu.in · Instagram: instagram.com/jindalpolicyresearchlab

Website:   jgu.edu.in/jsgp/jindal-policy-research-lab

The post appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

Pwonlyias.com

Executive Summary

The Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, abbreviated as FCAA, has been in the news headlines as it seeks to make major changes in India’s environmental governance. While the legislative intent emphasises achieving national Net Zero targets by 2070 and fulfilling India’s commitment to creating a carbon sink of 2.5 to 3.0 billion tons of CO2 equivalent by 2030, the amendments introduce critical impacts. Specifically, critical impacts of 5 provisions of FCAA have been thoroughly discussed in the following text: Section 1A, exclusion of ‘invisible’ categories, 100 km border belt exemptions, redefinition of forestry activities, and Green Credit Rules (GCR) linkage.

Firstly, FCAA restricts the legal ‘forest’ definition to lands recorded after October 1980, stripping protection from millions of hectares of ‘deemed forests’. Secondly, it risks mass ecological degradation by granting 100km border exemptions for strategic projects, particularly threatening Northeast India. Thirdly, by reclassifying safaris and eco-tourism as ‘forestry activities’, it permits permanent construction in fragile zones. Fourthly, it undermines indigenous sovereignty by bypassing Gram Sabha consent, contradicting the FRA 2006. Finally, through Green Credit linkages, it promotes market-based afforestation over traditional conservation and customary land rights.

About the Author
Akshat Sharma
Course: B.A. (Hons) Political Science, Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi, 2nd year Research interests: International Relations, Comparative Politics and Public Policy

Background

The trajectory of forest management in India has been a historical struggle between centralised state control and the decentralised survival needs of its indigenous populations. The original  Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 was a reaction to the unregulated diversion of forest land for industrial and agricultural expansion by state governments. For 16 years, the Act was interpreted strictly, covering only lands formally classified as forests.

However, the landmark 1996 Supreme Court ruling in TN Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India expanded this scope, mandating that the Act apply to all areas satisfying the dictionary meaning of ‘forest’ regardless of ownership or legal notification. This judicial intervention brought ‘deemed forests,’ sacred groves, and unclassed community lands under the protective umbrella of the central government’s oversight. It had a positive result, which was, the effective curbing of the fragmentation of biodiversity hotspots that existed outside official records. So this was all about the background, which is culminating into a problem described below.

Problem: The Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, represents a legislative attempt to ‘remove ambiguities’ arising from this expansive judicial interpretation (PRS Legislative Research 2023). But, critics argue it does so by drastically narrowing the definition of protected land.

Regulatory and Analytical Framework

The amendment limited the Act’s application to two categories of ‘protected lands’ (Kukreti 2024):

1. Notified Forest Land – Any land that has been declared or notified as a forest under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, or any other law currently in force.
2. Recorded Forest Land – Land that is not notified but has been recorded in Government records (Revenue or Forest Department) as ‘forest’ on or after October 25, 1980.

Due to the aforementioned definition of ‘protected land’, 5 provisions of FCAA assume importance:

Below is an infographic which shows the statistical impact of the main provisions of the FCAA:

Made by the authour using AI

Policy Options Analysis

1( Mandatory Harmonisation and Stage I Consent Reinstatement

This option proposes amending the Forest Conservation Rules of 2022 to explicitly require a certificate of complete FRA settlement and Gram Sabha consent before any ‘In-principle’ (Stage I) approval is granted for forest diversion.

State-Level ‘Deemed Forest’ Expert Committees and Cadastral Surveys

This option focuses on the 2024 Supreme Court interim order, requiring all state governments to complete the identification of all ‘deemed forests’ through Expert Committees before any further land is diverted under the FCAA 2023 exemptions.

Reform of the Green Credit

This option accepts the market-based approach of the FCAA but introduces rigorous, site-specific ecological and social safeguards. It mandates that Green Credit projects use indigenous species, maintain a minimum 10-year survival period, and provide a 25% ‘Community Credit Share’ to the local Gram Sabha.

Recommendations

1. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC)
   1. It must issue an official memorandum stating that the FCAA 2023 does not override the Forest Rights Act 2006.
   1. To prevent misuse, the 100km border exemption should be strictly limited to ‘linear’ projects essential for national defense, such as border roads and tactical outposts.
   1. There is an urgent need to redefine the Green Credit metric from a simple tree count to an ecosystem-service-based index that accounts for biodiversity, water recharge, and the presence of native biota.

• The Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) must provide technical and financial assistance to Gram Sabhas in the Northeast and border areas to map their Community Forest Resources (CFR) and establish their historical land records before they are targeted for ‘strategic’ diversion.

• Governments in states like Nagaland and Mizoram should pass legislative resolutions clarifying that the FCAA 2023 exemptions do not apply to lands held under customary tenure without the explicit consent of the state assembly and local councils.

Conclusion

The Forest (Conservation) Amendment  Act, 2023, represents a pivotal moment in the history of Indian environmental law, one that prioritises centralised developmental goals over the decentralised conservation model that has evolved over the last four decades. While the Act is framed as a necessary step toward meeting India’s global climate commitments and national security needs, the dilution of the definition of ‘forest’ and the systematic bypass of the Forest Rights Act create a dangerous regulatory vacuum.

The path forward requires a re-balancing of power. True forest conservation cannot

happen without the informed and voluntary participation of the communities that live within those forests. By harmonising the FCAA 2023 with the Forest Rights Act, reinforcing the role of the Gram Sabha, and ensuring that all ecologically significant lands (whether notified or not) remain under the protection of the state, India can achieve its climate and security goals without sacrificing its constitutional commitment to social justice and its rich natural heritage.

References::

• `CarbonCopy. ‘SC Order to Go by 1996 Definition of Forests: A Good Move, but Not Ambitious Enough, Experts.’ February 21, 2024. .
• Forest Survey of India. India State of Forest Report 2021. Dehradun: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2021..
• Forest Survey of India. ‘Status of Forest Resources in India.’ Accessed April 22, 2026..
• Kukreti, Ishan. ‘Why Forest Conservation Amendment Act May Be Deemed Unconstitutional.’ Down To Earth, March 25, 2024. .
• Press Information Bureau. ‘India’s Updated First Nationally Determined Contribution.’ Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. Published August 3, 2022..
• PRS Legislative Research. ‘The Forest (Conservation) Amendment Bill, 2023.’ Accessed April 22, 2026..

JINDAL POLICY RESEARCH LAB

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ

The Jindal Policy Research Lab brings together a student research lab and its parent academic school to produce non-partisan, evidence-based work on public policy. Together, they aim to give citizens, policymakers and institutions reliable analysis that can inform public opinion and support sound decision-making, without a predetermined position.

Jindal Policy Research Lab (JPRL)

A student-led research initiative under JSGP that produces non-partisan policy briefs, reports, infographics and commentary on current legislation and public policy, under the mentorship of faculty advisors.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy (JSGP)

The parent school at 91��Ƶ that houses JPRL, offering academic programmes in public policy, governance and electoral studies, and hosting several research centres and initiatives.

Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, 91��Ƶ Sonipat Narela Road, Near Jagdishpur Village, Sonipat, Haryana 131001, India Email: info@jgu.edu.in · Instagram: instagram.com/jindalpolicyresearchlab

Website: jgu.edu.in/jsgp/jindal-policy-research-lab

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India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 fluently demanded global finance and justice but its own record on coal expansion, underfunded adaptation, and toxic air quality reveals a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. This article argues that India cannot credibly lead on climate justice while failing to deliver its most basic form at home: the right to clean air.

1. Introduction

For many Indians who grew up in the 2000s and 2010s, environmentalism arrived in a neat, schoolfriendly package. “Reduce, Reuse, Recycle” sat at the center of every Earth Day activity. We drew the three chasing arrows on chart paper, pledged to avoid plastic straws, and were praised for bringing steel bottles to class. Climate change, as it was presented to us, floated in a morally uncomplicated space: no villains, no political economy, no reference to the infrastructure that powered our cities. Responsibility lived in our habits, not in the systems around us.

In 2025, this narrative no longer holds. COP30 in Belém is over, and the chasm between India’s global rhetoric and its domestic reality has never been wider. The Indian delegation spoke

fluently about justice, demanding that the 91��Ƶ North meet its climate finance obligations and labeling the existing $100 billion goal “suboptimal.” This critique is diplomatically sound. The rich nations have indeed failed to deliver. However, the singular focus on finance abroad allowed the government to sidestep confronting a lack of ambition at home.

2. Background

2.1 Context and History

Three measurable failures mark India’s position at COP30.

The first failure is our 2035 target. The Glasgow agreement set a clear expectation for countries to commit to a strengthened Nationally determined contribution (NDC) which basically stipulates a time bound roadmap for mitigation.¹ Despite our climate strategy being classified as “Highly Insufficient” by the Climate Action Tracker,² India is one of the major players that postponed this submission until after the conference. Our current framework for keeping the global temperature increase below 1.5 degrees celsius is severely lacking.

The second failure is our attitude towards coal. More than 130 nations supported a resolution to phase out fossil fuels, but India insisted on the term “phasing down of unabated coal.” The statistics reveal that India is planning more than 92 GW of new coal capacity in addition to what is currently under construction,³ and official documents outline that the total capacity will reach 307 GW by 2035.⁴ Coal is still the main component of India’s energy policy and no peak has been declared until the middle of the 2030s at least.

Third is regarding adaptation. India often frames its climate vulnerability around adaptation needs. Yet the Union Budget shows that key schemes have declining or zero allocations: the National Adaptation Fund has been given no meaningful budget for a second successive year, and funding to the National Coastal Mission has been cut.⁵ It is difficult to demand global adaptation finance while underfunding resilience at home.

3. Analysis

3.1 Core Argument

What is framed as episodic winter smog, is actually chronic, structural exposure that shapes lung growth, cognitive development, learning outcomes, and long term health. It dictates whether children can play outside, whether workers can work safely, and whether cities remain liveable.

¹United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact

²Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/ ³91��Ƶ Energy Monitor. (2024). 91��Ƶ Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/

⁴Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

⁵Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.

Despite what we were taught as kids, the fact remains that a crisis of this magnitude cannot be addressed by individual behaviour alone.

The most immediate contradiction is the air itself. The University of Chicago’s Air Quality life report shows us that most of our 1.4 billion live in places where the PM2.5 level is way above the WHO’s safe limit.⁶ Inhaling this toxic air reduces lifespan by an average of 3.5 years. In the Indo Gangetic plain, which includes Delhi NCR, the average loss is approximately 8.3 years.

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility. The world is now showing the consequences of policy decisions made by others. These are decisions made in favor of fossil fuel expansion, urban sprawl, weak industrial enforcement, and underfunded public transport among others.

We breathe the air that is decided upon in ministries, regulatory bodies, and energy plans, not with our reusable straws. Our childhood climate education did not prepare us for a world where the state normalizes air pollution levels that would be treated as a national emergency elsewhere.

3.2 Counter Arguments and Limitations

Recently, India has ranked within the first 100 countries worldwide in SDG ranking and this was mainly due to the efforts in poverty alleviation and provision of energy.⁷ SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), 13 (climate action), 14 (life below water), and 15 (life on land) remain the weakest points for India.⁸ Issues like air pollution, the loss of biodiversity, solid waste management, and climate mitigation are all far behind social sector progress. The 2030 Agenda commits India to a sustainable future, yet the air offers little evidence that we are on that path.

4. Implications

If India really wants to be an active player in climate justice, true justice that seeks to serve its citizens, then it has to surpass the stage of merely proclaiming the leadership role and indeed bring about fundamental change:

Declare a timetable for the phase-out of coal: a detailed schedule for the retirement of the current 210 GW coal capacity, and cancellation of the 92 GW pipeline.

Recognize clean air as a basic human right: Legally impose PM2.5 limits on cities with independent monitoring and actual penalties upon non compliance.⁹

⁷Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024. https://

⁸United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/

⁹World Health Organization. (2021). WHO 91��Ƶ Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.

Support local adaptation: revive the National Adaptation Fund¹⁰ and other resilience programs to cover all the needy communities now, rather than in some distant climate finance future.

Such national planning must align with what the health evidence makes clear: air pollution is not a seasonal inconvenience but a public health emergency. My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

Key Takeaways

• India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 prioritised demanding finance from the 91��Ƶ North while failing to submit a strengthened NDC or commit to a coal phase-out timeline.
• Air pollution in India is a structural public health emergency, not an individual responsibility — the Air Quality Life Index shows PM2.5 levels reduce average lifespans by 3.5 years nationally and 8.3 years in the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
• True climate justice requires domestic action: a coal retirement schedule, legally enforceable clean air standards, and a revived National Adaptation Fund.

5. Conclusion

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility.

My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

References

• Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact
• 91��Ƶ Energy Monitor. (2024). 91��Ƶ Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/
• Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

¹⁰Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

• Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
• Greenstone, M., et al. (2024). Air Quality Life Index Annual Report 2024. Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago. https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/annual-report/
• United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/
• Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024.
• World Health Organization. (2021). WHO 91��Ƶ Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.
• Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The post The Limits of India’s Climate Justice Narrative appeared first on 91��Ƶ.

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India’s booming gig and platform economy continues to operate with restricted social and legal safeguards. This article aims to examine whether the Union Budget 2026-27 makes any meaningful advancement in areas of social security of gig workers, allocations to the Welfare Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020, welfare design and accessible protection mechanisms, while questioning the role of platform companies in ensuring accountability and the welfare of workers.

Introduction

The rapid expansion of food and grocery delivery platforms such as Zomato and Swiggy have reshaped urban labour markets in India. Despite the humorous Blinkit hoardings highlighting what the nation shopped the most in one year, or Zomato’s regular pop-up notifications attracting

the consumers to order more from the platform, there lies a deeply exploitative nature of employment that is meted out to the gig workers. In absence of any legislation on minimum wages, regulated hours of work, social security codes that are existent on papers and a rapidly growing economy that demands you to get along, the gig workers have no option but to succumb to their situations. While the world celebrated the coming of a new year, the gig workers protested for their rights, logging out of their respective platforms. The nationwide strike made its way to the Parliament when it caught the attention of Mr. Raghav Chaddha, a Member of Parliament, who from the floor of the Parliament called out the exploitative nature of work being performed by the gig and the platform workers today.¹

The silver lining lies in the fact that the State for the first time unequivocally called out the exploitative nature of the quick delivery models, putting a stop to them. The approach was lauded by labour unions, domain experts and the workers themselves, and further invoked enthusiasm and hope from the Union Budget for the Financial Year 2026-27. It is in this backdrop that the Budget was viewed with much hope and expectation for the gig and platform workers.²

Defining and Measuring the Gig Workforce

The gig workers were first defined by the Code on Social Security, 2020, which is a central law that aims to extend social security benefits to unorganized, gig, and platform workers across India. The legislation defines a gig worker as “a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside of a traditional employer-employee relationship”. A report by NITI Ayog titled, “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy”, has

¹ Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

² Ani. (2026, January 13). Ban on 10-minute delivery: CAIT welcomes move to protect gig workers – The Tribune. The Tribune.

projected it to reach 23.5 million by 2029-30, up from 7.7 million in 2020-21.³ However, the attempts at enumerating the gig workers through surveys remain inefficient. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions.⁴

The Gap between Policy and Protection

The Union Budget fell short of meeting the expectations of the workers involved in the gig economy. The current Union Budget draws our attention to the striking gap between the legal recognition and the actual fiscal assistance for the workers who sustain this sector. One of the major expectations from the budget was that it would effectuate the social security safeguards for the gig workers through appropriate funding. But in reality it just reinstated its earlier policies such as health coverage under Ayushman Bharat and registration through e-Shram portal, without allocating any new fiscal support for their welfare. Therefore, social security protection still remains a far-fetched ambition for the gig workers as it is a mere reality on paper without any legal enforcement⁵.

The budget also highlights the absence of addressing the concern related to income instability that workers in this sector face due to irregular demand cycles and delayed payments. It fails to incorporate a legal framework that could regulate or set the bar for minimum wages earned by an informal worker. This makes the labor force solely dependent upon the platform which can unilaterally alter their incentives, commission and daily targets. While the Economic Survey 2025-26 recognises the urgency of skill based programmes for gig workers, the budget formally fails to accommodate this urgency and only takes into account the youth skilling programmes

3 Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.

IMPRI INSIGHTS.

4 Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

5 Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).

concerning developing technologies and artificial intelligence. Hence, making the gig workers more prone to economic vulnerabilities.⁶

Other major concerns associated with the gig economy are the absence of meaningful heed to the working environment and the lack of effective regulatory framework governing platform labour. Delivery partners and riders engaged with various platforms have to spend longer hours outdoors and directly bear the brunt of adverse weather conditions along with occupational risks. In a report published by Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union (TGPWU), which surveyed a total of 166 workers, only eleven respondents confirmed the availability of heat-protective gear, while just 31% out of the total respondents verified having access to clean washrooms. Yet, the budget has failed to acknowledge any public investment in improving the working condition of the gig workers specifically.⁷ Moreover, it also failed to allocate funds for enhancing the enforcement mechanism for the labour codes which could help empower the gig workers by making aggregators liable for the fair labour practices. An Effective Enforcement mechanism encompasses enhancing grievances redressal system, inspection rules and monitoring mechanism within the labour department. In the absence of such a mechanism, the gig economy will be exposed to greater exploitation in the face of algorithmic control and arbitrary decision making by the aggregators.⁸

The Codes on Social Security of 2020 propose the formation of a National Social Security Board focused on formulating and monitoring welfare schemes for unorganized, gig, and platform workers. As per the Codes, the Board would recommend schemes for life/disability cover, health benefits, and old-age protection.The Board is mostly just a symbol because there is

6 Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

7 Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024, August 17).

8 Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.

no budget or plan for how to put it into action. This makes it less effective as a way to protect gig and platform workers. The composition of the Board is as depicted below in Table1:

Table 1: Composition of the National Social Security Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020 for gig and platform workers

The Path Forward

The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers, as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions. The first and foremost priority of any policy that aims to empower the gig workers should be to integrate the workers in the wider ambit of social security schemes, as promised under the new Labour Codes of 2020. Furthermore, several critical issues persist such as those related to

algorithmic controls, arbitrary account suspensions, opaque payment systems, exploitative and unsafe working conditions- topped with little to no accountability witnessed from the platforms’ end. Details on creating a dedicated fund as part of the law for gig and platform workers to cover life, disability, health and old-age benefits are still awaited, which is a key component in safeguarding the rights of the gig workers, while holding the platforms accountable for the same.

Therefore, rule-making must ensure independent worker representation, diversify and stabilize funding, require algorithmic audits and platform data-sharing, and implement robust monitoring in order for the policy to be effective. Absent these measures, the statute’s impact will remain limited; with them, it could become a scalable model for protecting gig workers.

Key takeaways:

• India’s gig and platform economy is undergoing rapid expansion, still workers lack basic social security provisions, fair wages and safe working conditions.
• The Budget of 2026-27 largely reiterates the existing provisions, while any funding to the Social Security Board was absent.
• The questions of income stability, platform accountability and grievance redressal mechanisms still loom large over the gig and platform workers of the nation.

Conclusion

The Union Budget, while recognizing the unorganised workers through schemes like e-Shram Portal, largely remains silent on providing tangible policy solutions such as social security benefits. In order to achieve a more dignified and secure workspace for the workers, the Government must move beyond empty promises and depict its commitment to equality and fairness through enforcing the provisions chalked out in the Social Security Codes, 2020⁹ for the gig and platform workers. Given the backdrop and the complexity of the issue, both the central and state governments need to reconsider whether the policies actually elevate the social standing of the gig workers or act as a mere band-aid?

9 Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

References

1. Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.
2. Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.                                                          IMPRI                                                                              INSIGHTS.

• Himanshu Nitnaware. (2026, January 29). Economic Survey 2026: India’s fast-growing gig economy needs       an                       overhaul.                       Down                       to                                Earth.
• Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024,                                                                     August                                                                17).
• Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).
• Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.
• Factsheet details: (n.d.).

• Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

• Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

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